The bid valuation and construction problem for carriers facing combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts is very difficult and involves the computation of a number of NP-hard sub problems. In this paper we examine computationally tractable approximation methods for estimating these values and constructing bids. The benefit of our approximation method is that it provides a way for carriers to construct optimal or near optimal bids by solving a single NP-hard problem. This represents a significant improvement in efficiency. In addition, this method can be extended to many other applications.
Introduction
Combinatorial auctions are those in which the auctioneer places a set of heterogeneous items out to bid simultaneously and in which bidders can submit multiple bids for combinations of these items. Further, bids can be structured so that bidders can express their desire for a bundle of inseparable items (known as atomic bids), a collection of bids with additive values (known as OR bids) or a collection of atomic bids which are mutually exclusive (known as XOR bids). Our research investigates how sets of bids should be constructed in such an auction so as to optimize the efficiency of the auction from the perspective of an individual bidder. While combinatorial auctions have many applications, of primary interest to our research is the procurement of contracts for freight transportation services.
In the past, when shippers (typically large manufacturing companies or retailers) needed to procure transportation services for a set of distinctive delivery routes (called lanes) with different origins and destinations or delivery schedules, they would obtain quotes o n a lane-by-lane basis. That process can be modeled as a simple sealed bid reverse auction. However, recently shippers have begun to use combinatorial auctions for awarding service contracts.
In a freight transportation service procurement auction, carriers (trucking companies, or third party logistics providers) bid on contracts to move goods along predefined lanes for shippers. The pre-qualified carrier who submits the lowest bid is awarded the contract at the price bid. In this context, a carrier must determine the value of each contract as well as contract interdependencies in order to develop appropriate bids.
It is well known that the bid valuation and construction problem for carriers facing combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts is very difficult and involves the computation of a number of NP-hard sub problems.
Several recent researchers have examined the computational difficulties of the bidders' -3 -valuation problem in these auctions (see for example Parkes, 2000) . In this paper we examine computationally tractable approximation methods for estimating these values and constructing bids.
We first review research and practice related to combinatorial auctions and their application in the freight transportation industry. This is followed by a definition of the problem that must be solved and a discussion of the logical relationships between bids.
We then investigate situations in which the bidding carriers do not have any pre-existing commitments to other contracts. We provide an approximation method for this problem based on solving a set covering problem and discuss some important features of this method. We further extend that strategy to circumstances where prior commitments exist and propose a modified branch-and-bound method to search for near optimal bids.
Literature Review
The procurement of freight transportation services is a critical component for large shippers' logistics operations. In addition to their private fleets, shippers hire outside transportation companies under long or short-term contracts. It is estimated that in year 1997 the for-hire trucking industry alone contributed about $92 billion to U.S.
GDP (BTS, 1997).
In practice, most shippers follow a traditional procedure to procure transportation services including carrier screening, carrier assignment, load tendering and performance review ( Caplice, 1996) . Using this process, shippers attempt to reduce their costs and also to maintain a stable service levels under formal contracts. In addition, shippers use spot markets for occasional and spontaneous goods movement. Almost all assignments in these traditional transportation procurement modes are done in a lane-by-lane manner in which shippers select service providers for each individual traffic lane based on the price submitted by each carrier, or, a set of lanes are combined as a bundle and are considered inseparable. This procurement method can be modeled as a simple sealed-bid reverse auction and may be able to achieve economics of scale (Song and Regan, 2003) .
-4 -However, this method ignores the economies of scope property that trucking operations are more sensitive to. A significant portion of trucking costs is due to the repositioning of empty vehicles from the destination of one load to the origin of a subsequent load. Traffic lane operations exhibit interdependencies, that is, the cost of serving one lane greatly depends on the opportunity of serving other lane(s). Caplice (1996) examined this economies-of-scope property and observed that traditional procurement methods does not properly account for this property. He suggested the use of combinatorial auctions for transportation procurement in which a carrier can bid based on the synergistic values of a set of lanes. As a matter of fact, large shippers have recognized this prior to that research and began to use combinatorial auction based procurement methods in the early 1990's. Ledyard et al. (2002) discussed the procurement of trucking services by Sears Logistics S ervices in 1995. That auction included over eight hundred service lanes and a cost of nearly two hundred million dollars per year. Sears Logistics Services, through its consulting firm of Jos. Swanson and Co. and Net Exchange, conducted a multi-round combinatorial reverse auction in which participating carriers were pre-selected so as to guarantee service levels and reported a savings of 13%. Most recently, using a large-scale simulation model, Song and Regan (2003) showed that combinatorial auctions should also benefit carriers by reducing operational costs at the same time as cutting shippers' procurement costs.
In addition to the trucking industry, combinatorial auctions have also been applied to other resource allocation problems in which complementarities and substitution effects exist among heterogeneous assets and in which bidders prefer bundles to single assets.
These include but are not limited to auctions of wireless spectrum rights (Cramton, 2001) , airport time slots (Rassenti, 1982) and network routing (Hershberger and Suri, 2001) . A good survey of these activities can be found in de Vries and Vohra (2001) .
Combinatorial auctions contain some inherent difficult problems. The auction mechanism design problem, the question of how to design auctions in order to induce participants to bid their true valuations and achieve economic efficiency, has been a topic - presented a new design for combinatorial auctions and discussed this problem.
An important question in the design of combinatorial auctions is how bids should be expressed. A successful bidding language must allow bidders to express synergistic values on their desired combinations of items. In addition, the bidding language should be efficient so that the number of bids will be tractable. Nisan (2000) introduced three basic types of bids: atomic bids in which a bundle of items are treated as a single indivisible bid; OR bids which are set of atomic bids in which the bidder will serve any number of disjoint atomic bids for the sum of their respective prices; and, XOR bids in which the bidder will serve at most one item in a set of atomic bids at the specified price.
He illustrated that a combination of these basic types of bids such as OR-of-XORs or XOR-of-ORs can represent all possible valuations of bid items. Abrache et al (2002) pointed out that Nisan's bidding vocabulary is restrictive in that it cannot express such requests as " select K among N items" and is limited to indivisible goods. As a result, they proposed a two-level bidding framework to represent combined bids and analyzed its impact on the mathematical programming formulation of the allocation problem.
The winner determination problem, in which the optimal set of winning bids is identified, is known to be NP-complete and has attracted much attention. For example, Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad (1998) presented a formulation equivalent to a set packing problem (As reminder to readers, when the inequalities in a set covering problem are -6 -replaced by equalities the problem is called the set partitioning problem, and when the objective is maximization and all of the ≤ constraints are replaced by ≥ constraints, the problem is called the set packing problem.) Those researchers claimed that the manageability of combinatorial auctions depends upon the structure of permitted combinational bids rather than the number of bids. They also identified several special bid structures for which the winner determination problem is computationally manageable. de Vries and Vohra (2001) (2000) and Gonen and Lehmann (2000) provided a depth-first-search based algorithm embedded in a branch-and-bound framework to solve the multi-unit winner determination problem to optimal.
Most of the research mentioned above studied combinatorial auctions from the auctioneer's perspective and require that bidders or carriers know their true valuation on any combination of bid items (known as their private value) a priori, therefore they can structure and generate bids accordingly. However, this may not be true in practice, especially when a large number of combinations must be considered and in which bidders have hard local problems to solve. Parkes (2000) compared the auction performance for agents with hard local optimization problems and uncertain values for bid items. While acknowledging that market design cannot simplify the bidder's valuation problem alone, he argued that a well-designed auction could improve the quality of bidder's decisions.
In another paper, Parkes, Ungar and Foster (1999) introduced a bounded-rational compatible auction in which a bidding agent makes bid decisions based only on approximate information about the value of a good, that is, lower and upper bounds on its true value. Conen and Sandholm (2001) observed the exponential number of bundles that bidders may need to compute and therefore proposed a design of an auctioneer agent that uses a topological preference s tructure to request only necessary information from bidders, and as a result, reducing the number of valuation problems that bidders need to solve. Further, they presented a method to make their design incentive compatible so that bidders only need to compute their own preferences. Recently, Song and Regan (2003) -7 -pointed out that in the worst case a bidder must solve an exponential number of sub problems to identify their reservation prices and that each of these sub problems is NPhard.
The bid construction problem may be even harder in the procurement of freight transportation contracts. In the trucking industry, carriers not only need to consider the economies of scope exhibited in delivery routes from new contracts, they also have to find an efficient way to integrate new contracts with their pre-existing commitments.
This, normally modeled as a vehicle routing problem, is itself NP-complete in most cases as its solution typically requires the solution of variants of multiple traveling salesman problems. The solution of this problem provides a carrier's true valuation for a set of new contracts. Research on solving vehicle routing problems is common. Extensive reviews of the basic vehicle routing problem, time constrained routing and scheduling and dynamic and stochastic routing and scheduling can be found in Fisher (1995) , Desrosiers et al (1995) and Powell, Jaillet and Odoni (1995) , respectively.
Combinatorial auctions have been the topic of active research in the fields of operations research, c omputer science, economics and logistics during recent years.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt to examine the bid construction problem from the perspective of bidders. Of particular interest are the following questions: How should carriers determine their true valuation for any bundle of lanes from new contracts? What is the optimal way to structure different combinations of new contracts? These questions are not easy to answer even for simple cases. In fact, carriers encounter much more complex optimization problems and decisions than do shippers in a combinatorial auction. In this paper, we examine these questions and propose approximation algorithms to solve them.
-8 - here is that this carrier is willing to serve at most one of this set of bids. OR logical relationship refers to that this carrier is willing to obtain any number of bids for the sum of their respective bid prices.
3. A route is a sequence of nodes starting and ending at the same location and satisfies all operational constraints. A route includes a set of lanes and is the basis to generate a bid.
4. We also use ij bb I to denote the set of common lanes shared by bid i b and j b (in fact route i and j).
Problem Statement:
We consider trucking companies facing an invitation from a shipper to bid for contracts to serve a group of new lanes in a combinatorial auction. Each carrier is given the details of service contracts including: each lane's pickup location, the delivery location, the earliest pickup time, the latest delivery time and the number of full truckloads to be moved. Delivery time windows must be respected. In this research we consider only the truckload trucking problem in which the load must be moved directly to its destination before the vehicle can perform any other tasks. We assume that It is also observed that additive logical r elationships can be efficiently expressed by OR bids, and substitutable logical relationships can be represented by XOR bids with the number of these equal to the number of atomic bids. In the following we further discuss how to construct bids with respect to these logical relationships and use an ORof-XOR bidding language (Nisan, 2000) to describe the bid relationships.
Bid Construction in the Absence of Pre -existing Commitments:
In this context, carriers either do not have any pre-committed contracts or current lanes, or they do not intend to integrate new lanes into their current operations. Hence, they are only interested in the combination opportunities among new lanes themselves.
We first argue that a carrier does not need to express his XOR bids explicitly under such a circumstance, given the constraints defined in the winner determination problem. As such, carriers only need to examine OR bids. The reason is the following:
Suppose in a reverse combinatorial auction, a carrier generated a number of (Song and Regan, 2003) . We associate an empty cost j e with each bid j y that is equal to total empty cost of that route. We provide these candidate bids into a Set Partitioning Problem formulation of Bid Construction Problem (BCP-SP) as follows:
BCP-SP:
.. (2) 0,1 
..& (5) & (6) ,,0,1(7) This last feature of our strategy is very important in that optimal bids constructed by this strategy always minimize a carrier's empty cost regardless of the outcome of auction and also are independent of other competitors' bidding strategies. -15 -However, this bid construction strategy could omit some important bidding opportunities for substitutable bids due to its strict constraint that all bids are mutually exclusive of new lanes. Take the following for example: assume there are three new lanes for bid: AB , BA and BCA . Using the above strategy, a carrier will generate these optimal bids: {AB , BA }, {BCA , AB } with a total empty cost equal to () costAB . Now if this carrier loses BA in an auction, it will automatically lose AB , moreover, there is a good chance that it will also lose BCA since that bid incurs a large empty cost. In comparison, suppose that carrier makes an additional bid {AB , BCA }, then even if BA is awarded to another bidder, it will have a very good chance to win AB and BCA . To explore this kind of opportunities for substitutable bids, we relax the f irst constraint in the above BCP-SP formulation and remodel it as a Set Covering Problem: The set covering problem has been well solved and many good algorithms are known to reach exact solutions quickly. A complete reference on this problem is provided by Balas and Padberg (1976) . We noticed that multiple equivalent optimal solutions can exist for this problem and each of them constitutes a set of equivalent optimal bids. The most frequently used algorithm for integer programming problems -the branch and bound algorithm or its variants, will stop searching when any optimal solution is found.
BCP-SC
In order to explore the multiple optimal solutions, we propose to use a modified branch and bound algorithm to force the solver to search until all optimal solutions are found.
-16 -Using this algorithm, the solution to the above example turns to be: {AB , BA }, { BCA , AB }. Note that this solution also possesses the last two features of BCP-SP formulation (proof omitted). In addition, the single-item bid {BCA , AB } is discarded which might weaken carriers' competitiveness, however, this can be easily modified using an augmentation step and this does not impact the optimality of the solution.
Bid Set Augmentation:
For In summary, different logical relationships are treated with this optimization based bid construction strategy. First, bids with additive logical relationship do not need special treatment; when a set of lanes are complementary to each other, a bid by bundling these lanes is included and single-item bids are discarded if not in optimal solution; at last, substitutable bids are expressed with OR bids and completed with bid augmentation step. This bid construction strategy can be summarized as follows:
Step 1. Augment the original network by duplicating empty lanes for new lanes;
Step 2. Search all routes satisfying operational constraints;
Step 3. Feed routes into BCP-SC problem and solve it with modified branch and bound algorithm;
Step 4. Construct optimal bids from outcome of step 3;
Step 5. Check substitutable bids and use Bid Set Augmentation rule to detect additional bidding opportunities;
-17 -
Bid Construction in the Presence of Pre -existing Commitments:
In this section we extend the above bid construction strategy to the situation in which carriers have commitments for other contracts prior to the auction.
In such a context, two additional considerations have to be taken into account.
First, new opportunities emerge from a combination of new lanes and current lanes;
second, carriers' pre-existing routing plans might need to be protected. To explore new combination opportunities, we need to search combinations of new lanes and current lanes as well as opportunities among new lanes themselves at step 1 and 2 in the above bid construction strategy, and hence generate more candidate routes.
Next, we introduce these new opportunities into the BCP-SC formulation as follows:
..(12) As a result, the carrier has to use a bidding language such as OR-of-XOR to describe its preference. This makes the XOR logical relationship a critical decision in making bids.
In certain cases, XOR bids generated using this method could cause adverse results on carriers' bid decision. For instance, a carrier who has two current lanes {,} ABBA bids for a new lane BCA , and generates two bids using the above bid shares a current lane AB with pre-existing route {,} ABBA , hence this bid has to be replaced with bid 2 {,} bBCAAB = .
We summarize the bid construction strategy in the context of pre-existing commitments as follows:
Step 1. Augment the original network by duplicating new and current lanes;
Step 3. Feed candidate routes into BCP-SC2 problem and solve it with modified branch and bound algorithm;
Step 5. Check substitutable bids and use Bid Set Augmentation rule to complete bids;
Step 6. Apply rules in observation 3 for any two bids with common current lane(s) to develop XOR bids;
-20 -
Step 7. Apply Bid Substitution Condition for any bid that conflict with pre-existing routing plans to exclude "bad" bids.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the bid construction problem that carriers need to solve to generate bids in a combinatorial auction for the procurement of freight transportation contracts.
Optimization based strategies and the approximation algorithms were developed for situations i n which carriers do and do not have pre-existing commitments to other contracts. Our analysis proved that the proposed strategy is optimal for carriers in terms of operational efficiency in the first situation and near optimal in the second situation.
Most research to date is based on the assumption that bidders or carriers know their own valuations a priori and that they construct their bids accordingly. However, this assumption does not hold in many cases, and recently auction settings where bidders have hard valuation problems to solve are receiving more attention. In particular, a bidder needs to consider an exponential number of combinations in the worst case and needs to compute many NP-hard sub-problems. In this paper, we proposed an approximation strategy in which carriers are capable of constructing bids in an optimal or near optimal way and in which this NP-hard problem is only solved for once.
Though specifically aimed at the carrier bid construction problem in combinatorial auctions for t he procurement of trucking contracts, we believe this methodology can be extended to broader fields where similar properties exist among bid items in combinatorial auctions. This method is particularly robust in circumstances in which fewer candidate bids exist for the integer programming problem due to, for instance, complicated work rule structures.
-21 -Extensions of this work include empirical analysis to examine the robustness of the proposed strategy. The model developed in this research assumes that the size of candidate bids in the set covering problem is manageable, when this does not hold, other techniques such as column generation should be considered. Finally, from the point of view of overall freight transportation system efficiency, we point o ut that these auctions encourage competition between carriers that can lead to inefficiencies. These auctions would yield maximal efficiency only if carriers can develop collaborative relationships (Song and Regan, 2002) .
